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Executive Summary 
 
The Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) is a one-percent joint county-city sales 
and use tax.  Currently, 147 counties in Georgia impose a LOST on purchases within 
their county boundaries that is designed to be shared between the county and 
municipal governments.A  Only Cobb, DeKalb, Rockdale, Gwinnett, and Cherokee 
counties do not, at this time, have a LOST.B  In 2001, LOST revenues exceeded $900 
million statewide. County and municipal LOST revenues accounted for 26 percent 
and 24 percent of their budgets, respectfully.  
  LOST originally came into existence in 1975 as a county tax.  Its initial 
purpose was to provide property tax relief.  The law, at the time, stated that the LOST 
revenue was to be shared with the municipalities within the county for the purpose of 
providing tax relief for the residents. This legislation stipulated that revenues from 
LOST be allocated between the county and municipalities on the basis of the 
proportion of the county’s population in the unincorporated area and in the 
municipalities of the county, respectively. 
The LOST law was challenged in 1979 and deemed unconstitutional by the 
Georgia Supreme Court.  The law was revised to set up 159 special districts 
corresponding to county boundaries and to make LOST a joint county-municipal tax 
in which the revenues could be shared between the qualified county and municipal 
governments.  Under the new law, any government within the county was deemed 
qualified to receive a distribution of the LOST revenues if that government levied at 
least one tax in addition to the sales tax and provided at least three of the following 
six  services:  water,  sewage,  law enforcement, fire protection, garbage collection, or  
                                                          
A Because it is a joint city-county tax, if the county has a LOST, it is imposed on all taxable sales 
within its borders.  Eight counties currently impose a LOST in which the funds are earmarked for 
the county school system.  Therefore, revenues from the LOST in these cases are not involved in 
any allocation debate.  One county, Towns, imposes both a LOST for the school system and a 
LOST that is allocated between governments. 
B DeKalb and Rockdale counties levy a HOST, which is a county sales tax dedicated to county 
property tax relief for homeowners. 
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libraries.  Municipal governments that fulfill these conditions are allowed under the 
legislation to receive a share of the LOST revenues.C   
The new law did not, however, specify a new formula to be used in 
distributing the revenues between the county government and the qualified 
municipalities. In 1994, the law was further amended to require periodic 
renegotiation of the distributions between the county and municipalities, but still did 
not specify a formula for allocating the funds.  The legislation did, on the other hand, 
provide a list of eight factors to be considered when determining the allocation of the 
LOST funds between governmental units.  These eight factors are not well defined, or 
easily ranked in terms of importance, and in some cases either are not quantifiable or 
require information not currently collected by the Department of Revenue or other 
agencies.  Therefore, these factors provide little guidance to the distribution 
discussions between the counties and their municipalities.   
This lack of guidance in allocating the LOST revenues has become a 
significant problem for many counties and their municipalities.  Many of the recent 
LOST agreements required outside mediation in order for an agreement to be 
obtained by the December 31, 2002 deadline.  In many cases the agreed upon 
allocation of LOST revenues may not be in the best interest of all parties; it is thought 
that many county and municipal agents accepted less than optimal allocations in order 
to have easy negotiations and keep good relations, or because one of the parties has 
come to rely on LOST revenue.   
The focus of our research is on the allocation of the LOST revenues between 
the county and municipal governments.  This research reviewed various aspects of 
the LOST allocation and considered several alternative methods of distributing LOST 
revenues between the county and sub-county units.  This is a complex problem with 
high stakes. Because the allocation is a zero-sum game, any change in the allocation 
is almost guaranteed to make one party worse off than under the current allocation.  
                                                          
C Small qualified municipalities can choose a status referred to as “absent” municipality.  As such 
they do not participate in the negotiation process but do receive a per-capita share of the LOST 
revenue allocated to all municipalities in the county.  As long as the combined total population of 
all the absent municipalities is less than 50 percent of the total qualified municipal population, the 
county may still reach a lawful agreement. 
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The real gains lie in both sides being freed from negotiations that are oftimes long 
and costly in terms of staff time and outside consultants.    
While there was no one perfect formula found to make this process free of all 
negotiation, in presenting these alternative allocation mechanisms, several standards 
come to light.  First, the allocation mechanism should be relatively easy to compute 
and as free of debate as possible.   That is, the necessary data should be easily 
available and noncontroversial.  In order to produce a simple rule, it is necessary to 
resist the urge to use the allocation of LOST funds to solve existing 
intergovernmental fiscal problems.  Solutions to issues such as double taxation or 
suburban use of municipal services and infrastructure require large amounts of 
complex data.  Requiring governments to incorporate these data into their 
negotiations will probably overwhelm the process (as is most likely the case with the 
existing eight criteria), causing the talks to lag or causing the parties to seek a more 
straightforward guide.   
A second standard is that the distribution be fair.  While this sounds obvious, 
it is a hard goal to achieve.  The difficulty lies in the fact that the LOST is collected 
from individuals and businesses but distributed to governments.  A fair distribution in 
the eyes of the individuals may not result in a fair distribution in the eyes of the 
governments receiving a distribution.  Therefore, when choosing an allocation 
formula, officials and policy makers should consider the “fairness” of the allocation 
from both perspectives.    
Another important characteristic of any method of distribution is that it 
delineate between the county's responsibility to the unincorporated population and its 
responsibility to all county residents.  By differentiating between those county 
services which serve all county residents and those designed to benefit mainly the 
unincorporated residents, the decision of which allocation formula to use can be made 
clearer.  
Any new allocation mechanism also needs to incorporate a phase-in period.  
That is, when the new LOST distribution percentages become effective, they should 
do so over a two to three year period.  While this characteristic is not necessary to 
achieve a simple rule, discussions with several experts involved in the recent LOST 
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negotiations have stated that allowing a phase-in period would facilitate smoother 
negotiations and result in more equitable distributions.  
Lastly, the factor used to allocate the LOST revenue should be mutually 
exclusive between the government units receiving a distribution.  As is discussed in 
the full report of this research, distribution rules based on population do not meet this 
criterion.   Populations of the municipalities are not mutually exclusive from the 
county populations, since municipal residents are also county residents.  Because 
population is not a mutually exclusive factor, distributions based on population are 
only applicable to sub-county governments, such as municipalities.  In sub-county 
allocations population is a successful allocation mechanism.  The necessary data is 
readily available, easy to compute, and the mechanism yields a fair distribution.    
On the other hand, the research considered several formulas based on 
mutually exclusive factors such as property taxes or government expenditures that are 
appropriate for distributions between the county and the sub-county units of 
government.  (The details are presented in the full report.)  In the case of property 
taxes, two allocation formulas are devised based either on which group of individuals 
pays the tax (municipal or unincorporated) or which government levies the tax 
(municipal or county).  Both formulas are shown to be easy to compute, require 
available data, and result in a fair distribution between governments.  Use of 
government expenditures yields a similar result but incorporates a larger picture of 
the government’s finances.  A third proposal, referred to as the Equalization Fund, 
eliminates all need for future negotiations, but requires the imposition of an 
additional tax.  The existing LOST revenue and the new revenue are combined to 
form a pool of funds that would then be split on a 50-50 basis between the municipal 
governments (as a group) and the county government.  Another alternative is to 
allocate a fixed percent of the LOST revenues to the county government to be used 
for the benefit of all county residents.  The remainder would be divided between the 
municipal governments and the unincorporated governments.  This approach has the 
advantage of allowing a separate allocation to the unincorporated areas.  The final 
alternative is an approach that distributes the LOST revenues directly to the county 
residents, thus bypassing the county and municipal governments altogether.  Under 
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this approach, the LOST revenues are distributed such that all county residents 
receive an equal percentage “refund” on their property tax payments.     
No single allocation mechanism was found to provide a perfect solution to the 
allocation difficulties.  But there are large gains to be made by creating a well-
organized process that is fair and recognizes the many difficult aspects of the 
relationship between the county and the sub-county governments. 
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I.  Introduction 
The Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) is a one-percent joint county-city sales 
and use tax. Currently, 147 counties in Georgia impose a LOST on purchases within 
their county boundaries which is designed to be shared between the county and 
municipal governments.1  Only Cobb, DeKalb, Rockdale, Gwinnett, and Cherokee 
counties do not, at this time, have a LOST.2  In 2002, LOST revenues exceeded $1 
billion statewide. County and municipal LOST revenues accounted for 26 percent and 
24 percent of their budgets, respectfully.  This revenue source is second only to the 
property tax, which accounted for 47 percent of the county budgets and 24 percent of 
the municipal budgets statewide.  While other revenues sources such as franchise 
taxes on utilities and hotel/motel taxes serve to supplement their budgets, these 
sources do not come close to the amount of revenue raised by the Local Option Sales 
Tax.  
  LOST originally came into existence in 1975 as a county tax.  Its initial 
purpose was to provide property tax relief.  The law, at the time, stated that the LOST 
revenue was to be shared with the municipalities within the county for the purpose of 
providing tax relief for the residents. This legislation stipulated that revenues from 
LOST be allocated between the county and municipalities on the basis of the 
proportion of the county’s population in the unincorporated portion and in the 
municipalities of the county, respectively. 
The LOST law was challenged in 1979 and deemed unconstitutional by the 
Georgia Supreme Court.  The law was revised to set up 159 special districts 
corresponding to county boundaries and to make LOST a joint county-municipal tax 
in which the revenues could be shared between the qualified county and municipal 
governments.  Under the new law, any government within the county was deemed 
qualified to receive a distribution of the LOST revenues if that government levied at 
                                                          
1 Because it is a joint city-county tax, if the county has a LOST, it is imposed on all taxable sales 
within its borders.  Eight counties currently impose a LOST in which the funds are earmarked for 
the county school system.  Therefore, revenues from the LOST in these cases are not involved in 
any allocation debate.  One county, Towns, imposes both a LOST for the school system and a 
LOST which is allocated between governments. 
2 DeKalb and Rockdale counties levy a HOST, which is a county sales tax dedicated to county 
property tax relief for homeowners. 
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least one tax in addition to the sales tax and provided at least three of the following 
six services: water, sewage, law enforcement, fire protection, garbage collection, or 
libraries.  Municipal governments which fulfill these conditions are allowed under the 
legislation to receive a share of the LOST revenues.3   
The new law did not, however, specify a new formula to be used in 
distributing the revenues between the county government and the qualified 
municipalities. In 1994, the law was further amended to require periodic 
renegotiation of the distribution amounts between the county and municipalities, but 
still did not specify a formula for allocating the funds.  The legislation did, on the 
other hand, provide a list of eight factors to be considered when determining the 
allocation of the LOST funds between governmental units.  These eight factors are 
not well defined, or easily ranked in terms of importance, and in some cases either are 
not quantifiable or require information not currently collected by the Department of 
Revenue or other agencies.  Therefore, these factors provide little guidance to the 
distribution discussions between the counties and their municipalities.   
This lack of guidance in allocating the LOST revenues has become a 
significant problem for many counties and their municipalities.  Many of the recent 
LOST agreements required outside mediation in order for an agreement to be 
obtained by the December 31, 2002 deadline.  In many cases the agreed upon 
allocation of LOST revenues may not be in the best interest of all parties; it is thought 
that many county and municipal agents accepted inappropriate allocations in order to 
have easy negotiations and keep good relations, or because one of the parties has 
come to rely on LOST revenue.   
The focus of this study is on the allocation of the LOST revenues between the 
county and municipal governments.  As stated earlier, the legislation provides very 
little in the way of direction concerning the allocation of the LOST revenues.  The 
original legislation based the allocation on population, while later changes to the 
                                                          
3 Small-qualified municipalities can choose a status referred to as “absent” municipality.  As such 
they do not participate in the negotiation process but do receive a per-capita share of the LOST 
revenue allocated to all municipalities in the county.  As long as the combined total population of 
all the absent municipalities is less than 50 percent of the total qualified municipal population, the 
county may still reach a lawful agreement 
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legislation outlined eight factors to be considered in the allocation decision.  In an 
effort to simplify the process of allocating the revenues between governmental units, 
this report first clarifies the allocation problem and then presents several possible 
allocation formulas or procedures.  The advantages and disadvantages of these 
formulas are discussed.   
The report proceeds as follows.  The next section contains a discussion of the 
difficulties in applying the factors listed in the 1994 legislation.  This is followed by a 
discussion of why and how the process should be simplified.  Section IV discusses 
issues associated with designing an allocation procedure.  The final section presents 
alternative factors and procedures that might be used in determining an allocation of 
LOST revenue.   
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II.  The Present Allocation Status 
The initial LOST legislation included a specific allocation formula for the 
distribution of the revenues between the county and municipal governments.  This 
formula allocated revenues in proportion to the population residing in the 
unincorporated region of the county versus the municipalities.  Although the original 
legislation was deemed unconstitutional, the allocation formula by which the funds 
were distributed was not specifically altered in the revised legislation. 
In 1994, the LOST legislation was again revised to include a provision 
requiring periodic renegotiation of the allocation agreement.  In addition, the new 
legislation included eight criteria to be considered when allocating LOST revenues.  
The purpose of this list was to provide a set of guidelines to be used when allocating 
the LOST funds between the municipalities and the county government.  The goal 
was to create a set of factors which could be used in determining a “fair” allocation 
between the various qualifying governments.   
The criteria highlight several important issues which are of concern to county 
and municipal government officials but fall short of their intended goal for several 
reasons.  First, there is no overall statement of what is fair when allocating the LOST 
funds.  Second, several of the criteria focus on creating an allocation of the LOST 
funds that would mend existing inequities between the municipal and county 
governments.  That is, the approach is to allocate the LOST revenues in the larger 
context of all service delivery and revenue issues between county and municipal 
governments.  (These issues are also the subject of the service delivery plans required 
by HB 489.)  This approach would use the LOST funds to offset any shortcomings in 
the service delivery agreements or other intergovernmental agreements, or to solve 
problems of double taxation.  Third, many of the criteria are expressed with such 
vague language that they are very difficult, and in some cases impossible, to measure.  
Lastly, the guidelines are not prioritized in anyway so that even if they could be 
measured, the measures cannot be aggregated to reach a conclusion on the final 
distribution.  In fact, the legislation, with respect to some of the criteria, only suggests 
that certain factors be considered in the allocation.  Without a ranking system, these 
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factors could lead the allocation in several conflicting directions instead of to one 
common conclusion.   
The first criterion stipulates that the allocation rule should take into account 
“the service delivery responsibilities of each political subdivision to the population 
served by the political jurisdiction and served during normal business hours, 
conventions, trade shows, athletic events and the inherent value to a community of a 
central business district and the unincorporated areas of the county and the obligation 
of all residents of the county for the maintenance and prosperity of the central 
business district and the unincorporated areas of the county”.  This single criterion 
actually incorporates three different issues.   
First, governments frequently serve a population other than their own 
residents.  This argument typically relates to a central business district serving a 
working population that is much larger than its residential population.  This is a long-
standing matter that both municipal and county officials have struggled with for some 
time.  Central business districts must provide and maintain infrastructure and services 
due to the additional workday nonresident population, but it has no means to tax this 
population without also taxing its own population.  Thus, one impetus behind this 
criterion is to create a mechanism through which the non-municipal residents can 
compensate the municipal government for the provision of services to non-residents 
during the workday or special events.4  While this criterion does have some relevance 
to this debate over the allocation, the concept of daytime population is somewhat 
vague and cannot be measured with precision.   
Second, an issue incorporated in this criterion has to do with recognizing the 
“inherent value” of both the central business district and the unincorporated areas.  
That is, proximity to the central business district adds value to the unincorporated 
(and other municipal) areas of the county and the existence of the unincorporated area 
gives value to the central business district.  
Lastly, this first criterion states that all residents (municipal and county) have 
an obligation to support both the central business district and the unincorporated 
                                                          
4 There may also be a need to provide compensation between municipalities as well. 
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areas of the county.  While both of these last two issues may be true, neither is 
something that can be measured.  
The second and third criteria consider the service delivery responsibility of 
each political subdivision.  This draws the issue of “need” into the allocation 
decision, implying that  the LOST be used as a redistribution instrument.  That is, it 
implies that a government with more service responsibility should receive more of 
the LOST funds.  Since the LOST revenues were not originally intended to be used 
for redistributive purposes, these guidelines expanded the purpose of the LOST 
allocation.   
The fourth criterion considers the effect of a change in sales tax distribution 
on the ability of each political subdivision to meet its short-term and long-term debt.  
This criterion proposes continued reliance on the status-quo distribution and may lead 
to a distribution that is far from fair.   
The fifth criterion states that the allocation should take into account the point 
of sale which generates the tax that is to be apportioned.  This implies that tax 
revenue should be allocated on the basis of where it was paid as opposed to who paid 
it.  At this time, the Department of Revenue does not collect data on the point of sale 
within a county.  Furthermore, the point of sale may not be the appropriate basis for 
allocation of LOST, but rather it may be the point of residence, i.e., who pays the tax.  
In many counties, especially rural counties, consumers must purchase their goods and 
services inside the municipality due to a lack of commercial activity in the 
unincorporated area.  In this case, it would seem to be inappropriate to credit all sales 
tax revenue generated in municipalities to the municipal government, even in the 
event that such data was collected.  A further difficulty with this criterion is that a 
sale within a municipality is also a sale with the county. Thus, unless “county” is 
interpreted to mean the unincorporated portion of the county, this criterion cannot be 
applied. 
Criteria six and eight focus on intergovernmental and service delivery 
agreements between political subdivisions.  These agreements are governed by 
separated negotiations.  These service agreements are linked to the sales tax only in 
that the sales tax revenues could be used to reimburse one government for services 
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provided by another.  The amount of the compensation, though, should be preset at 
the time of the LOST negotiation.  This amount should be determined at the time of 
the service delivery agreements and, therefore, not subject to debate during the LOST 
negotiations.   
The last criterion deals with the use of property taxes and other revenue paid 
by some taxpayers to subsidize the cost of services provided only to other taxpayers 
of the levying government.  This is a form of double taxation.  The most common 
example of this is the case in which the municipal residents face the same county 
property tax rate as unincorporated residents but receive fewer services.  This is 
another long-standing debate between the municipal and county governments.  While 
this is a serious and difficult issue, the source of the problem lies with the property 
tax levy and not with the imposition of LOST.  Therefore, it would be best to solve 
this conflict outside the context of the LOST negotiations since existence of the 
LOST tax is irrelevant to this debate.   
Although these criteria bring to light many important factors to be considered, 
they provide no guide to measuring these factors or a method of weighting one factor 
against another.  Because of this, many cities and county governments are without 
guidance on an appropriate allocation procedure.  Experience has shown that many 
municipal and county governments, due to the absence of a clear and simple 
allocation rule, still loosely base their allocation, at least in part, on unincorporated 
and municipal population as stated in the original legislation.   
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III.  Simplifying the Allocation Procedure 
At first blush, it would seem appropriate to consider using the LOST revenues 
as a tool to address all sorts of fiscal equity problems between the municipal and 
county governments.  Seen in this context, the LOST revenues could be viewed as 
one of many revenue sources and expenditures that come together to form an 
allocation of revenue and services to the various jurisdictions.  In this model, LOST 
revenues are the mechanism by which this allocation is made more palatable.  That is, 
in this approach governments can use the LOST revenues for compensation for 
various inequities such as cases of double taxation, compensation for services 
provided by one government to another as defined by a service delivery agreement, or 
as compensation for use of municipal services and infrastructure by suburban 
commuters.   
The downside to this model though, is that it has tremendous data 
requirements.  For instance, in the case of double taxation, both parties must first 
agree that such an issue exists and then agree on how to quantify it.  Neither are 
insignificant debates.  Attempting to place a value on services received through a 
service delivery agreement so as to determine the correct amount of compensation is 
at least as, if not more, complex. 
An alternative approach is to consider the problem of allocating the LOST 
funds in isolation.  That is, to resist the temptation to use the LOST revenues to solve 
existing issues between governments and focus only on how to equitably distribute a 
pool of revenue between various governments or various sets of residents.  This 
approach allows for a simpler allocation rule, several of which are discussed later in 
this paper, with far few data requirements.  Not only will this allow for smoother, less 
contentious negotiations over the LOST allocation, but depending on the exact 
formula chosen, it will allow the allocation to be periodically updated without the 
need for new negotiations.  This approach means reverting back to the allocation 
environment in the pre-1994 era.  That is, an environment which is not dependent on 
the relationship between the governments 
The current legislation also specifies that the allocation is set for ten years and 
then once renegotiated, the new allocation takes effect all at once.  With an allocation 
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that will last 10 years, the outcome of the negotiation takes on great importance and 
thus each party will press its case as strongly as possible.  In addition, with this 
revenue stream set in place for ten years, the government becomes reliant on it.  If, 
over time, the conditions on which the previous negotiation were based change 
substantially, then the new agreement would likely yield a very different allocation.  
This can leave a government in a serious predicament.  In fact, in discussions with 
LOST mediators, there have been times when the final agreement is softened in favor 
of the government that has become reliant on LOST revenue during the previous ten-
year period.  Employing a simpler allocation rule, with data requirements that could 
be easily updated, would allow the allocation to change more frequently than every 
10 years as the values of the factors in the formula change.  This would prevent 
potentially harmful shocks to the budget seen in the current locked-in approach. 5  In 
fact, during the 2002 negotiations several county and municipal governments worked 
around this 10-year rule by filing LOST certificates with multiple effective dates.   
With these certificates, the allocation percentages would change over the ten-year 
period  as negotiated by the parties.     
 
                                                          
5 It will also increase uncertainty in the local budgeting process as the LOST revenue funds will 
not be known exactly from year to year.   
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IV.  Issues Regarding Alternative Allocation Formulas 
Before proceeding further in the design of an alternative formula, it is useful 
to clarify several key concepts.  The first of these is the issue of fairness.  Clearly a 
desired characteristic of any allocation rule is that it create a fair distribution of 
revenues between the parties.  A fair distribution requires that equal parties be treated 
equally and that unequal parties be treated in a manner that reflects that inequality.  In 
case of the LOST revenues, though, there are several ways of defining equity or 
fairness. Furthermore, it is not even clear which are the relevant parties, individuals 
or governments, to be considered in the equity decision.  Thus in this situation, 
fairness is a somewhat complex concept. 
Philosophers have discussed for centuries what is a fair allocation to 
individuals.  We have a general understanding in principle of what it means to have a 
fair distribution across individuals, although there will be substantial disagreement on 
what basis should be used in order for a distribution to be considered fair.  For 
example, if we were to allocate a pot of sales tax revenue among individuals, some 
people might argue that an equal amount should be allocated to each individual, while 
others might say it should based on sales taxes paid, and still others might suggest the 
allocation be inversely related to income.  There is no similar philosophic discussion 
or common understanding about what it means for an allocation across governments 
to be fair.  Consideration of equity among governments is crucial in this debate 
because while individuals and businesses pay the LOST, the allocation is under 
current law a distribution to municipal and county governments.  
Depending on the allocation rule applied, a fair distribution to governments  
may or may not result in an equitable distribution to individuals.  For example, 
current law states that one criterion for allocating LOST revenue is that it be returned 
to the jurisdiction in which the sales tax revenue was collected.  This criterion implies 
that such a basis for an allocation among governments is fair.  However, suppose that 
this is considered in terms of an allocation to individuals.  Assume there is an amount 
of sales tax revenue to be distributed to individuals and it was suggested that the 
funds be allocated based on the location of the sale.  It is hard to imagine that this 
result would be considered fair to individuals.  This is particularly true in cases of 
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where the majority of the commerce takes place in the municipal boundaries.  Such a 
rule would allocate the majority of the sales tax revenue to the municipality even 
though some amount of the revenue was raised from the purchases of unincorporated 
businesses and residents who may not have the opportunity to shop in the 
unincorporated areas of the county. 
The point of this discussion is twofold.  First, to note that there is no 
agreement on what is fair.  Second, to point out that what might be considered fair for 
an allocation across individuals is not the same as what might be considered fair for 
an allocation across governments. 
A second issue to be clarified is the apparent confusion over the use of the 
term “county”.  It is important to distinguish between the county government and the 
unincorporated area of the county.  The original LOST legislation made such a 
distinction, and in fact allocated revenue to the municipalities and to the 
unincorporated area, with the payment to the later being made to the county 
government.  The 1994 legislation confused the issue, with some of the criteria 
suggesting that the county government’s share of LOST be based on conditions in the 
unincorporated area, while other criteria implying an allocation directly to the county 
government for the benefit of the entire county population.   
It is important to distinguish between an allocation to the county government 
for countywide taxes or services, and an allocation to the county government on 
behalf of the unincorporated area.  Thus, in the discussion that follows we distinguish 
between the following: 1) municipal governments; 2) the county government in its 
role of providing countywide services; 3) the county government in its role of 
providing municipal services (e.g., police) to the unincorporated area of the county.6   
A further issue arises regarding the use of an allocation to the county on 
behalf of the unincorporated area.  When a special service district (i.e., a district in 
which a separate property tax is levied for the services provided) exists to provide 
municipal services to the unincorporated area, such a district should be treated the 
same way as a municipality, with the LOST allocation used to reduce the special 
                                                          
6 For the purposes of allocating the funds, any unqualified municipality would be combined with 
the unincorporated population.   
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service property tax or increase services in the special service district.7  When no 
such special service district exists, a question arises regarding the use of the LOST 
allocation to the county government on behalf of the unincorporated area.  If the 
revenue is used to reduce county taxes countywide, residents of the unincorporated 
area argue that the municipal residents benefit from the share of LOST revenue that is 
suppose to benefit residents of the unincorporated area.  Municipal residents counter 
that they are being double taxed since countywide taxes are disproportionately used 
to finance services in the unincorporated area.  This leads to an argument regarding 
fiscal equity, a matter that HB 489 was suppose to resolve.  If the LOST allocation 
procedure is to avoid getting into all matter of fiscal equity issues, then it would 
certainly seem that LOST revenue allocated to the county on behalf of the 
unincorporated area be used for the exclusive benefit of the unincorporated area, and 
leave the other issues of fiscal equity to a different venue.  It would be up to the 
county government to determine how to allocate the unincorporated area’s share so 
that the unincorporated area benefits from the allocation.  On the other hand, an 
allocation to the county government for countywide purposes should be used to 
benefit all county residents. 
Thus, the allocation of LOST revenue across governments can be thought of 
as two separate decisions.  First is an allocation to the county government in its role 
of providing countywide services.  This allocation should be used for the benefit of 
all county residents, either in the form of reduced property taxes or increased 
services.  Making the county allocation first, guarantees that both the municipalities 
and the unincorporated areas contribute to the operation of the county government.  
Second is the allocation among all of the qualified municipalities and the county on 
behalf of the unincorporated area.  This in effect puts the unincorporated area on an 
equal footing with the municipalities.  The original legislation, in effect, provided a 
zero allocation to the county in its role of providing countywide services.  The 1994 
legislation implies a non-zero allocation, but is unclear as to how that allocation 
should be determined. 
                                                          
7 Because special service districts do not meet the qualifications to receive their own LOST 
distribution, their allocation is included in the county’s.   
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A final issue concerns the factors that are used as the basis for determining 
distribution of the LOST revenue.  Since the percent distributions need to sum to 100 
percent so that all funds are distributed, the sum of the value of the factor across all 
governments receiving a distribution must equal the total of that factor.  This means 
that the factor must be mutually exclusive between the jurisdictions that are to receive 
a distribution.  For instance, the populations of two municipal governments are 
mutually exclusive in that a resident can only claim one principal residence.  On the 
other hand, the populations of the county and the municipalities are not mutually 
exclusive since a resident of a municipality is also a resident of the county.  Because 
population is not a mutually exclusive base, it is not possible to use the county’s total 
population to calculate the allocation for the county government and the 
municipalities in one formula.  This characteristic of allocation bases implies that 
some allocation bases are best suited for the allocation between sub-county units (i.e., 
municipalities and the unincorporated area), while others are best suited for the 
allocation between the county for countywide purposes and the sub-county units in 
aggregate.     
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V.  Alternative Allocation Formulas 
 This section presents several possible factors or formulas that might be used 
for allocating LOST revenue.  We first consider factors that are appropriate for 
allocation among sub-county units, i.e., municipalities and the unincorporated area, 
and then turn to a discussion of factors that are appropriate for allocation both 
between the county and the sub-county units and among sub-county units.  
 
A.  Allocation Among Sub-County Units  
1.  Population 
As has just been discussed, population is an appropriate choice for allocating 
funds at the sub-county level, i.e., between the municipal governments and the county 
government on behalf of the unincorporated area.  Many county and municipal 
governments use population as a starting point and as a checkpoint in their LOST 
negotiations.  Population was also the basis for the allocation prescribed in the 
original LOST legislation.  Its popularity as an allocation factor makes it a convenient 
starting place for the discussion of alternative solutions.   
The use of population as a basis for distributing revenues has several 
appealing qualities.  First, the necessary data is readily obtainable and easy to use.  
While the allocation agreement currently uses the population figures from the 
decennial Census, population estimates are available for intervening years allowing 
the allocation shares to vary over the 10-year period.  However, these are less 
accurate than the Census data and may lead to disagreements regarding the correct 
value of current population.  Second, an allocation based on population tends to 
return the tax to those who paid it, which is one measure of equity between 
individuals.8     
                                                          
8 This assumes that all residents contribute equally to the tax revenues or consume at the same 
amount.  If a distinct income disparity exists between the unincorporated population and the 
municipal population, then an allocation based on population may not be considered fair.  For 
instance, if one municipal population is small relative to the unincorporated population but has a 
higher average income, they may be contributing more to tax revenues, but because the allocation 
rule is based on population, the municipality will be receiving fewer funds than their contribution.   
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To illustrate the use of population consider Example A, where  LOST funds 
are distributed on the basis of population in each sub-county unit (i.e., the 
municipalities and the unincorporated area) relative to total county population.  In 
this case the unincorporated area is considered to be equivalent to a municipality, and 
while the county government receives an allocation, it is on behalf of the 
unincorporated area. The county government as a provider of countywide services 
receives a zero allocation.  
Example A.   
 Municipality A population = 20,000 
 Municipality B population = 30,000 
 Unincorporated area population = 50,000 
 Total county population = 100,000 
 
 Distribution allocation –  
County share = unincorporated population/(total county population) = 
50 percent 
Municipality A = (Municipality A pop.)/(total county pop.) = 20 
percent  
Municipality B = (Municipality B pop.)/(total county pop.) = 30 
percent 
 
 In this formulation, each individual in the county is credited with an equal 
amount of the LOST revenue.  That is, everyone in the county “earns” an amount 
equal to total LOST revenue divided by the county population.  Each sub-county unit 
(municipalities and the unincorporated area) within the county thus receives an 
amount equal to the per capita sales tax revenue times the unit’s population. 
One of the potential problems that arises from this distribution concerns how 
the funds allocated to the county on behalf of the unincorporated area are used.  The 
basic premise of the population-based allocation is that every individual in the county 
will benefit equally, either in terms of property tax relief or increased service 
provision since every sub-county unit receives an equal per capita amount of the 
LOST revenue.  If there is a special service district in the unincorporated area, and if 
the LOST funds allocated to the unincorporated area are used for the exclusive use of 
individuals in the unincorporated area, then this fairness is achieved.  However, if the 
county uses the LOST funds for countywide property tax relief or service provision, 
the LOST allocation to the unincorporated area benefits all county residents, both 
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those living in municipalities and in the unincorporated area.  Residents of the 
unincorporated area view this as unfair.  On the other hand, if the county uses the 
county allocation to finance “municipal services” in the unincorporated area, then 
municipal residents view the use of the unincorporated area’s LOST allocation to 
provide tax relief or additional services just to the unincorporated area as unfair.  
Establishing special service districts to fund services provided in the unincorporated 
area would negate this issue.  But in any case this should be the subject of HB 489 
discussions.     
Population is not an appropriate factor for determining the allocation between 
the county for countywide purposes and the sub-county units.  The crux of the 
problem is that every resident of a municipality is also a county resident.  One might 
suggest a population-based allocation formula that treats all residents as county 
residents while also recognizing that they are residents of municipalities and the 
unincorporated area.  This suggests adding the population of the county and the sub-
county units.  Examples B and C illustrate two different ways this might be 
implemented.   
 
Example B.   
 Total County population = 100,000 
 Municipality A population = 20,000 
 Municipality B population = 30,000 
 Unincorporated area population = 50,000 
 
 Distribution allocation:  
 County share = county pop/(total county pop. + total muni. pop) = 67 
percent 
Municipality A = (muni. A pop.)/(total pop. of county + total 
Municipal population A & B) = 13 percent 
Municipality B = (muni. B pop.)/(total pop. of county + total 
Municipal population A & B) = 20 percent 
 
 
Example C.   
 Total County population = 100,000 
 Municipality A population = 20,000 
 Municipality B population = 30,000 
 Unincorporated area population = 50,000 
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 Distribution allocation –  
County share = county pop. + unincorp. pop. /(total pop. of county + 
total Municipal pop. A&B + total unincorp. pop.) = (county 
pop.+unincorp. pop.)/(twice the total county pop.) = 75 percent 
Municipality A = (muni. A pop.)/(twice total pop. of county) = 10 
percent 
Municipality B = (muni. B pop.)/(twice total pop. of county) = 15 
percent 
 
 The formula in Example B is a commonly proposed formula for allocating the 
funds.  In Example B just the residents of the municipalities are added to the 
countywide population to form the base population.  While in Example C, residents 
of both municipalities and the unincorporated area are added to the county population 
to form the base.  
These alternative formulas do have a serious disadvantage in that they 
guarantee that the county government will receive at least 50 percent of the LOST 
revenues.9  That is, even in the absence of an unincorporated population, the county 
government will receive 50 percent of the LOST revenues regardless of the size of 
the county government. If the unincorporated population is zero, there is a zero 
allocation to the county on behalf of the unincorporated area, but the county still 
receives a 50 percent allocation for the benefit of all county residents.   
 Since the county population is not a mutually exclusive group, using 
population as an allocation rule between the county and municipal governments does 
not work especially well.  Other allocation rules discussed below are shown to be 
much more appropriate for the allocation between the county for countywide 
purposes and the sub-county units that still adhere to the ease of use standard.     
 
2. Source of Sales Tax Revenue 
Using population as an allocation rule is based, at least in part, on equity 
being defined by who pays the sales tax.  An alternative basis for equity is where the 
sales tax is collected.  If each municipality and the unincorporated area had their own 
sales tax, then the revenue would go to the respective governments on the basis of 
                                                          
9 As one can see from the formulas that as the unincorporated population decreases to zero 
(contained in the county population figure), both formulas reduce to ½.  If the unincorporated 
population increases then only the county  receives additional funds.   
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where the tax was collected.  As with population, such a factor only works for 
allocation at the sub-county level, and not for the allocation between the county and 
the sub-county governments.  Since any sale made in a municipality is also made in 
the county, there is no logical basis for allocating the sales between the county and 
the municipality. The major difficulty with using this factor is that the information on 
where sales are made is not available, although potentially the Department of 
Revenue could be required to collect this information.    
 
B.  Allocation Between County and Sub-County Units 
 Workable formulas that use population or sales tax receipts essentially imply 
that the allocation to the county government is on behalf of the residents of the 
unincorporated area, and in the absence of any unincorporated area, the county would 
receive a zero allocation.  While not explicitly stated in the original legislation, that 
was what was implied.  If the county government in its capacity of providing 
countywide services is to receive an allocation of LOST revenue, then different 
factors have to be used.  We discuss four ways of approaching this issue.  Note that 
these factors could be used to allocate LOST revenues among sub-county units even 
if the share to the county for countywide purposes is zero. 
 
1.  Property Tax Receipts 
Another commonly proposed form of the allocation formula is based on 
property taxes paid.  The rationale for the use of this factor for the allocation stems 
from one of the two stated purposes of the LOST, i.e. the provision of property tax 
relief. It is also related to the service responsibilities of the various governments, such 
as those driven by large daytime populations. 
This allocation formula distributes the LOST revenues according to residents’ 
property tax payments.  Note that the allocation should be based on property tax 
revenues prior to any rollback.  Since county property taxes are mutually exclusive 
from municipal property taxes, this rule is appropriate for both the county and sub-
county unit allocation and for the allocation among sub-county units.  Because the 
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allocation rule focuses on the relative size of governments, this formula achieves 
equity between qualified governments as well as between individuals.   
The use of property tax revenue as a base for allocating the LOST revenue 
has two particular strong points.  First, the necessary information, property tax 
revenues, is readily available, making the formula easy to compute.  Second, the 
amount allocated to each government can be adjusted annually since property tax 
revenues change annually. This will reduce discrepancies that can build up over time 
between the allocation based on the current value of the factor and the negotiated 
allocation amount.  
One way to implement this option is to calculate each government’s property 
tax revenue as a share of total property tax paid in the county.  If a special service 
district exists, LOST revenue would be allocated to the special service district.  This 
is illustrated in Example D.  In Example D, the distribution formula allocates funds 
based on which government levied the tax.  This formula credits the county with all 
the property taxes it levies.  The municipal government is credited with only the 
property taxes it levies, as opposed to all the property taxes paid by its residents.    
Unlike the formulas illustrated in Examples B and C, this formula does not 
result in a minimum distribution of 50 percent to the county government because 
property taxes between the county and municipal governments are mutually 
exclusive.  Even in the absence of an unincorporated area, this formula does not 
guarantee the county 50 percent of the LOST revenues.  If the unincorporated 
population is small relative to the municipal population, then it is expected that the 
county government would be relatively smaller due to the presence of a larger 
municipal government.  In this case, use of the formula would allocate a relatively 
smaller share of the LOST revenues to the county government, as would be 
appropriate.     
Example D. 
County property tax revenue from unincorporated residents only = 
$100,000 
County property tax revenue Municipal A residents only = $50,000 
County property tax revenue Municipal B residents only = $50,000 
Municipal A property tax revenue = $100,000 
 Municipal B property tax revenue = $200,000 
 Total property tax revenue = $500,000 
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 Distribution allocation –  
County share = Total County tax payments/(Total County + 
Municipal property tax payments) = 40 percent 
Municipality A = Muni. A tax payments/(Total County + Municipal 
property tax payments) = 20 percent  
Municipality B = Muni. B tax payments/(Total County + Municipal 
property tax payments) = 40 percent 
 
The issue of what the county does with its LOST allocation does not arise 
here.  Fairness is based on taxes paid, and everyone is credited, or “earns” a LOST 
allocation equal to the property taxes he or she paid relative to all property taxes paid 
in the county.  If there is a special service district, then tax payments from this district 
would be included in the formula and it would receive its own allocation just like the 
municipalities.  If not, then the residents of the unincorporated area get credit for the 
taxes they pay to the county government in the same way that residents of the 
municipalities do.  Each resident of the county receives the same per-capita share of 
taxes paid.  If the county for countywide purposes is not to share in the LOST 
allocation, then county property taxes for countywide purposes would be excluded 
from the formula and the LOST would be divided between the municipalities and any 
special service district   
An alternative approach is for municipalities to receive a distribution in 
proportion to the total property taxes paid (including county taxes) by the municipal 
residents compared to county and special service district property taxes paid by 
unincorporated residents in the county.  This formula is illustrated in Example E.  In 
this example, everyone gets “credit” for his or her share of the total property taxes 
collected in the county, but the allocation is made just to the sub-county units.  That 
is, this allocation rule assumes that the county government receives a zero allocation 
from the LOST fund.   
 Example E  
 County property tax revenue from unincorporated residents only = 
$100,000 
County property tax revenue Municipal A residents only = $50,000 
County property tax revenue Municipal B residents only = $50,000 
Municipal A property tax revenue = $100,000 
  Municipal B property tax revenue = $200,000 
  Total property taxes =$500,000 
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County share = unincorporated property tax payments/total property 
tax payments of all county residents = 20 percent 
Municipality A share = municipal plus county property tax 
payments/total property tax payments of all county residents = 30 
percent 
Municipality B share = municipal plus county property tax 
payments/total property tax payments of all county residents = 50 
percent 
 
There are several disadvantages to using property tax revenues as a base for 
the allocation formula.  First, not all municipalities levy a property tax. In order to be 
a “qualified” municipality for purposes of receiving LOST funds, the municipal 
government must levy at least one tax in addition to the sales tax but many levy a 
hotel/motel tax instead of a property tax.   
Second, the size of the allocation awarded to a governmental entity under this 
formula is directly influenced by the amount of property taxes levied.  This provides 
an incentive to each government to impose higher property taxes and rewards 
inefficiency, although it is unlikely to be a significant influence on the level of 
property taxes.  This problem could be alleviated by using the property tax digest 
instead of property tax revenues, although using the digest would undermine the goal 
of property tax relief.  Without the actual tax rates, the true tax burden cannot be 
determined.  In fact, it is easy to imagine instances where jurisdictions might need to 
impose higher property tax rates to offset their low property values and other 
jurisdictions may be allowed to impose lower rates because they enjoy high valued 
property.  In such a case, using the property tax digest as a base would allocated more 
funds to the jurisdiction with the high valued property and aggravate the tax burden 
of the low property value jurisdiction by reducing their LOST allocation.  
 
2.  Government Expenditures 
 The use of government expenditures as an allocation base is the mirror image 
of the property tax formula with a bit more inclusion because government 
expenditures are financed by more than just property tax revenues.  Because of this, 
many of the same advantages and failings of the property tax as an allocation factor 
apply.  Like the previous approach, this approach is designed to achieve a fair 
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distribution between governments and is not necessarily concerned with providing a 
fair allocation between populations.  Under this approach, the governmental unit with 
the larger expenditures is ranked higher and receives a larger share of the LOST 
funds.  As an allocation method, this approach meets the ease of use standard as 
expenditure data is readily available and legislation can be written to define the 
relevant components.  Because county expenditures are mutually exclusive from 
municipal expenditures and municipal expenditures are mutually exclusive from 
other municipalities, this approach is applicable to both the county/sub-county units 
allocation and the allocation among sub-county units.  
Unlike the two previous approaches, the expenditure-based approach can only 
take one form.  This formula allocates the LOST funds as a percentage of all 
expenditures of the qualified governments.  Therefore, if municipal expenditures 
were 30 percent of the sum of all qualified governments’ expenditures for that 
county, then the municipal government would receive 30 percent of the LOST funds.  
In the property tax model, alternative formulas were available due to the two possible 
manners in which to treat the county taxes paid by municipal residents.  In the case of 
expenditures, except when there is a special service district the county expenditures 
for countywide services versus expenditures for unincorporated residents are not 
identified.  Therefore, just one form of this allocation formula exists. 
This approach has the potential to be manipulated by the governments. Under 
this approach, a governmental unit can increase its allocation by increasing 
expenditures in any manner.  To the extent that the county increases expenditures that 
primarily benefit unincorporated residents as opposed to all county residents, the 
county creates a situation whereby the municipal residents subsidize the 
unincorporated residents.  On the face of it, this allocation rule also produces an 
incentive for larger and inefficient government spending because it rewards large 
government budgets, although this is not likely to be a significant force since it would 
require large excessive spending to influence the allocation in any significant manner.  
Lastly, as with property taxes, basing the allocation on expenditures reflects the 
service demands of the government, including the service requirements associated 
Alternative Formulas for Allocating LOST Revenue  
To Counties and Municipalities 
 
 
 23
with a large daytime population.  Expenditures should probably be measured net of 
grants received. 
 
3.  Fixed Percentage Allocations  
 An alternative approach is to set a fixed percentage of the LOST revenues to 
be allocated to the county government for countywide purposes.  This money would 
be earmarked for the provision of countywide services designed to benefit all county 
residents, such as county courts.  This percentage could be legislated by law and be 
the same for all counties.  The remaining revenues would be divided between the 
unincorporated residents and the municipal residents based on population, 
government expenditures or property tax revenue.  The difficulty of course lies in 
deciding the share to be allocated to the county government.   
 A possible approach to determining the county share is to allocate LOST 
revenue to the county for countywide purposes based on its expenditures on 
mandated services such as courts and sheriff.  An amount of LOST revenue per dollar 
of expenditures paid from non-grant revenue could be set.  For example, $2.30 for 
every $100 spent on these services could be allocated to the county.  In this way, 
counties that had large service responsibilities would receive a large dollar allocation.   
The remaining LOST funds can be divided between the municipal population 
and the unincorporated population on the basis of population or property tax 
revenues.  In this way, all citizens of the county contribute to the county government 
because their contribution is based on expenses of services designed to service all 
county citizens.  Furthermore, it separates the unincorporated population from the 
county government and allows them to have a status equal to that of the municipal 
residents.  Of course, county governments with above average expenditures are 
penalized under this approach to some degree as their expenditures above the average 
do not contribute to their LOST distribution amount.  County governments with 
below average expenditures receive a windfall in the sense that they receive funds 
based on expenses they do not incur.   
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4.  Lost Equalization Fund 
In the minds of many public officials and policy makers, the primary purpose 
of LOST is to relieve the existing pressure on property taxes, either reducing property 
taxes or increasing spending without an increase in property taxes.  If all of the LOST 
revenue was allocated to the county and the county used the revenue for property tax 
relief, then every taxpayer would get a reduction in property taxes.  On the other 
hand, if all of the LOST revenue were allocated to sub-county units on a per capita 
basis and used for property tax reduction, all taxpayers would get a reduction in 
property taxes.  In both cases, property taxpayer would, on average, get the same 
property tax reduction.  Differences would exist because of differences in per capita 
property tax bases among sub-county units.  But essentially, taxpayers would in 
indifferent between the two allocations.  However, the county and sub-county units 
are clearly not indifferent as to how LOST revenues are allocated.  One of the reasons 
why is that the government that gets the LOST revenue can have lower property 
taxes. 
It is believed that there would be less friction and less contentious debate 
between the county and municipalities over the LOST distribution if there were some 
reassurance that, say the county, would not be seen as having increased property 
taxes if its LOST allocation was less.  None of the solutions discussed above 
addresses this problem associated with the allocation between the county for 
countywide purposes and the sub-county units.   
One way to accomplish this is through the following option.  Under this 
option, a special entity called the Equalization Fund would levy a property tax on all 
property within the county that raised the same amount of revenue as the LOST.  
Thus, two separate but equal pots of money are available for allocation, the LOST 
revenues and the special property tax revenue, henceforth referred to as the 
Equalization Fund.  These two pots of money are combined and allocated to the 
county government and to the sub-county units.  The shares to the county for 
countywide purposes from the LOST and the Equalization Fund would sum to 100 
percent, i.e., if the county received 30 percent of the LOST revenue, it would receive 
70 percent of the Equalization Fund revenue. 
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The following gives an example of how this would work.  For simplicity we 
assume no unincorporated area and that the allocation between municipalities is 
based on population.  Consider a county with two municipalities, denoted 
Municipality A and Municipality B.  They have a population of 500 and 250 
respectfully, for a total county population of 750.  Given the property tax bases and 
millage rates, Municipality A collects $500,000 in property taxes.  Municipality B 
collects $150,000, and the County government collects $560,000.  Residents of City 
A pay 17 mills of property tax (10 for the City and 7 for the County), while residents 
of City B pay 12 mills (5 for the City and 7 for the County).  Assume that the LOST 
yields $75,000, or $100 per capita. The Equalization Fund would thus have to 
generate $75,000, which would require a millage rate of 0.9375 levied on all 
residential and business property in the county. We assume full rollback of the 
property tax rate for the LOST revenue received as well as for any allocation received 
from the Equalization Fund, just as in the current law.  Jurisdictions would be free to 
increase their millage rate so that part of the LOST revenue is used for expanded 
services. 
Consider Allocation Alternative I, in which the County government gets all of 
the LOST revenue.  The county government can lower its millage rate by 0.9375, 
from 7.000 to 6.0625, or by 13.4 percent.  City A would get $50,000 from the 
Equalization Fund and City B would get $25,000, since we are assuming that the 
allocation across municipalities is based on population. Thus, City A can reduce its 
property tax rate to 9 mills (from 10 mills), or by 10 percent, and City B can reduce 
its property tax rate to 4.1667 mills (from 5 mills), or by 16.7 percent. 
Total revenue (after the rollback) of all three jurisdictions are the same as 
without the LOST.  (Recall we assume a full rollback, although the jurisdictions 
could increase property tax rate beyond the rollback rate.) Property taxes per capita 
are $100 less than without the LOST, which is the LOST revenue per capita.  All 
three governments have reduced their millage rate (after the rollback and before any 
increase in service levels.) 
Allocation Alternative II has the same outcome, except that the County 
government gets $75,000 in Equalization Fund revenue while the municipalities share 
Alternative Formulas for Allocating LOST Revenue  
To Counties and Municipalities 
 
 
 26 
the LOST revenue.  Since the allocation to the governments is the same under 
Allocation Alternative II as under Allocation Alternative I, the results are the same.  
Thus, in both alternatives property tax rates for the municipalities and the county go 
down.  
If the LOST revenue were split 60/40 with municipalities and the county, the 
result would still be the same, except that the LOST revenue would be allocated as 
follows: $30,000 to the county, $30,000 to City A, and $15,000 to City B. The 
Equalization Fund would be allocated as follows: $45,000 to the County, $20,000 to 
City A, and $10,000 to City B.  The total each jurisdiction gets is the same as under 
Alternative I and Alternative II. 
The key aspect of this solution is that it eliminates the zero-sum exclusive 
nature of the situation.  Currently, the LOST allocation can be described as a zero-
sum game.  Gains to one government can be seen as losses to another.  This solution, 
by creating a second pool of funds, eliminates this aspect of the allocation decision.  
This will result in easier and in all likelihood, quicker negotiations.  While this 
approach does not explicitly provide rules for the allocation of the LOST revenues 
between the county and municipal governments, it is designed to always achieve a 
50/50 split between the municipalities (as a group) and the county government of the 
combined pool of the LOST revenues and the Equalization fund.  Because of this 
property, there ought to be little debate about the allocation since whatever amount is 
not obtained from the LOST funds are made up from the Equalization fund.   
The downside to this approach is that it increases the tax burden of the 
residents of the county by imposing the second property tax necessary to fund the 
Equalization fund.  Second, this solution will automatically allocate 50 percent of the 
sum of the LOST revenues and the Equalization fund to the county government and 
50 percent to the municipal governments without any consideration of the services 
provided by either government.  Lastly, this approach does not allow for the separate 
treatment of the unincorporated areas of the county.  They are considered only in the 
context of the county government’s allocation.   
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C.  Direct Allocation 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from the previous approach, a method 
could be designed to refund the LOST revenues directly to the individuals of the 
county.  Under this approach the governments, both county and municipal, are 
completely left out of the allocation decision.  All funds are dispersed directly to the 
property tax payers, residents and business property owners, within the county.  One 
approach to the allocation would be to base it on the amount of county (or county and 
municipal) property taxes paid.  The allocation could be based on other factors, for 
example, an equal amount per capita. 
If property taxes paid was the basis for the allocation, all LOST funds would 
be allocated to taxpayers so that all property tax payers in the county receive a 
reimbursement equal to some percentage of their county property tax payments.  All 
taxpayers in the county would receive the same percentage reimbursement of their 
property tax, essentially an equal percentage rebate on property taxes paid.  Because 
the county and municipal governments do not receive any LOST revenue under this 
approach, property taxes, either municipal or county, are not rolled back as they are 
under current law due to the receipt of LOST funds.  This will keep the pressure on 
property taxes and may result in a reduction in government services as expenditures 
would now have to be funded through an increase in the property tax.   
As an allocation approach, this method has several appealing characteristics.  
First, it eliminates the need for allocation negotiations between the county and 
municipal governments, as all allocations would be made directly by the state to the 
individual taxpayers.  However, this may not be easy for the state to administer.  
Second, this approach maintains equity between the county and municipal property 
tax payers of the county.  All property tax payers, whether municipal or 
unincorporated, are treated equally under this approach.  The downside to this 
approach is that individuals may not view the reimbursement as a reduction in their 
property taxes.  Essentially this approach reduces property taxes paid by the amount 
of the LOST revenue.  But if individuals do not recognize the reimbursement as an 
indirect reduction in their property taxes, they may misunderstand the point of a sales 
tax that is returned to taxpayers.  To the extent a taxpayer’s property tax payment 
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does not match its LOST tax payment, this approach becomes a redistribution 
mechanism.  For instance, a firm may pay little sales taxes but receive a large 
property tax rebate because it has large taxable property value.   
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VI.  Conclusion     
This report has discussed various aspects of the LOST allocation and 
presented several alternative methods of distributing LOST revenues between the 
county and sub-county units.  This is a complex problem with high stakes. Because 
the allocation is a zero-sum game, any change in the allocation is almost guaranteed 
to make one party worse off than under the current allocation.  The real gains lie in 
both sides being freed from negotiations which are oftimes long and costly in terms 
of staff time and outside consultants.    
While there was no one perfect formula found to make this process free of all 
negotiation, in presenting these alternative solutions, several standards come to light.  
First, the allocation mechanism should be relatively easy to compute and as free of 
debate as possible.  That is, the necessary data should be easily available and 
noncontroversial.  In order to produce a simple rule, it is necessary to resist the urge 
to use the LOST funds to solve existing intergovernmental fiscal problems.  Solutions 
to issues such as double taxation or suburban use of municipal services and 
infrastructure require large amounts of complex data.  Requiring governments to 
incorporate this data into their negotiations will probably overwhelm (as is most 
likely the case with the existing eight criteria) the process, causing the talks to lag or 
causing the parties to seek a more straightforward guide.   
A second characteristic is that the distribution be fair.  While this sounds 
obvious, it is a hard criteria to fulfill.  The difficulty lies in the fact that the LOST is 
collected from individuals and business but distributed to governments.  A fair 
distribution in the eyes of the individuals may not result in a fair distribution in the 
eyes of the governments receiving a distribution.  Therefore, when choosing an 
allocation formula, officials and policy makers should consider the “fairness” of the 
allocation from both perspectives.    
Another important characteristic of any method of distribution is that it 
delineate between the county's responsibility to the unincorporated government and 
its responsibility to all county residents.  By differentiating between those county 
services which serve all county residents and those designed to benefit mainly the 
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unincorporated residents, the decision of which allocation formula to use can be 
eased.  
Any new allocation mechanism also needs to incorporate a phase-in period.  
That is, when the new LOST distribution percentages become effective, they should 
do so over a two to three year period.  While this characteristic is not necessary to 
achieve a simple rule, discussions with several experts involved in the recent LOST 
negotiations have stated that allowing a phase-in period would facilitate smoother 
negotiations and result in more equitable distributions.  
Lastly, the factor used to allocate the LOST revenue should be mutually 
exclusive between the government units receiving a distribution.  As was discussed in 
this report, distribution rules based on population do not meet this criteria.   
Populations of the municipalities are not mutually exclusive from the county 
populations, since municipal residents are also county residents.  Because population 
is not a mutually exclusive factor, distributions based on population are only 
applicable to sub-county levels.   On the other hand, this report provided several 
formulas based on mutually exclusive factors such as property taxes or government 
expenditures which are appropriate for distributions between the county and the sub-
county units of government.    
No single allocation mechanism presented in this report incorporates all these 
recommendations.  Nor does any one formula perfectly allocate the LOST.  But there 
are large gains to be made by creating a well-organized process which is fair and 
recognizes the many difficult aspects of the relationship between the county and the 
sub-county governments. 
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